The Authentic Appeal of the Lying Demagogue: Proclaiming the Deeper Truth about Political Illegitimacy

Oliver Hahl [iD],[a] **Minjae Kim,**[b] **and Ezra W. Zuckerman Sivan**[b]

Abstract

We develop and test a theory to address a puzzling pattern that has been discussed widely since the 2016 U.S. presidential election and reproduced here in a post-election survey: how can a constituency of voters find a candidate "authentically appealing" (i.e., view him positively as authentic) even though he is a "lying demagogue" (someone who deliberately tells lies and appeals to non-normative private prejudices)? Key to the theory are two points: (1) "common-knowledge" lies may be understood as flagrant violations of the norm of truth-telling; and (2) when a political system is suffering from a "crisis of legitimacy" (Lipset 1959) with respect to at least one political constituency, members of that constituency will be motivated to see a flagrant violator of established norms as an authentic champion of its interests. Two online vignette experiments on a simulated college election support our theory. These results demonstrate that mere partisanship is insufficient to explain sharp differences in how lying demagoguery is perceived, and that several oft-discussed factors—information access, culture, language, and gender—are not necessary for explaining such differences. Rather, for the lying demagogue to have authentic appeal, it is sufficient that one side of a social divide regards the political system as flawed or illegitimate.

Keywords

political sociology, authenticity, electoral politics, 2016 election, norms

In a representative democracy, voters and politicians enter into a principal-agent relationship; it is therefore rational for voters to select candidates, in part, based on their trustworthiness. A straightforward implication is that voters will prefer candidates they perceive as "authentic"—that is, candidates whose claims to pursue the public good are backed by their short-term actions and long-term commitments. But the very nature of politics generally makes authenticity hard to achieve (Jones 2016). Politicians are beset by the suspicion that they are interested only in

furthering their private interests or those of a particular subgroup (McGraw, Lodge, and Jones 2002). This suspicion is general to anyone who is aware she will earn status and

[a]Carnegie Mellon University Tepper School of Business
[b]MIT Sloan School of Management

Corresponding Author:
Oliver Hahl, Carnegie Mellon University Tepper School of Business, 5000 Forbes Avenue, Pittsburgh, PA 15213
Email: ohahl@andrew.cmu.edu

influence if she is successful; observers can thus reasonably suppose the person is extrinsically, rather than intrinsically or prosocially, motivated (Hahl and Zuckerman 2014).

To be sure, doubts about a politician's authenticity may remain latent until the politician acts in ways that reveal a gap between her "front stage" presentations and "backstage" reality (see Goffman 1956; Hahl 2016). Perhaps the most common way for such gaps to be exposed is when a candidate adjusts her message to address different groups of voters or adapts her policies with the changing times (Jones 2016). These forms of inconsistency can raise suspicions that the candidate is an inauthentic panderer. It follows that suspicions of inauthenticity will be even greater insofar as two more extreme conditions apply: (1) the politician knowingly makes false statements, or (2) she deliberately violates publicly-enshrined norms. Accordingly, past research has assumed that politicians will lie only to the extent that they do not expect to be caught (Davis and Ferrantino 1996; McGraw 1998), and that any norm violations will be limited to staking out positions that are somewhat more liberal or conservative than their constituencies (Abrams et al. 2008; Chang, Turan, and Chow 2015; Morton, Postmes, and Jetten 2007). In short, we are unaware of any research that explains why voters might see a "lying demagogue"— someone who deliberately makes evidently false statements and breaks publicly-endorsed prescriptive norms while catering to widely-held private prejudices—as authentic.

This puzzle became particularly salient in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. As might be expected, one of the candidates—Hillary Rodham Clinton—was harmed by the perception she was inauthentic.[1] Not only did her critics claim she was motivated by personal self-interest rather than the public welfare (as reflected in her having amassed great wealth from her and her husband's political careers), but many saw her as having deliberately lied and broken basic norms. According to the nonpartisan fact-checking organization Politifact, 38 percent of Clinton's campaign statements were partly untrue and 12 percent were

completely false.[2] Moreover, over the course of the campaign, Clinton was exposed as having violated the norm (and arguably the law) that classified government information should be secured, as well as norms of fair play associated with political primaries and debates. But if it is unsurprising that Clinton's candidacy was harmed by perceptions of her inauthenticity, it is puzzling that the winning candidate, Donald J. Trump, was perceived by his supporters as appealingly authentic despite abundant evidence that (1) he was at least as sensitive to private self-interest as Clinton, with no corresponding record of public service;[3] (2) he was considerably more prone to falsehood than Clinton;[4] and (3) he deliberately flouted many norms that had been taken-for-granted for many years and were widely endorsed.[5] Given such a pattern of lying demagoguery, it is unclear how a significant portion of the electorate found Trump to be authentic and voted for him partly as a result. Moreover, because lying demagogues in many other elections, including Hong Joon-Pyo in the 2017 Korean presidential election,[6] are not necessarily perceived as authentic, our challenge is not to account for Trump's perceived authenticity in particular, but to explain variation in the authentic appeal of the lying demagogue more generally.

This challenge is met only part way by existing theory, which usefully recognizes how sharp partisan identification can cause voters to forgive erstwhile disqualifying behavior by their preferred candidates. In particular, strong partisan identification can shape access to news and information (Benkler et al. 2017; but see Allcott and Gentzkow 2017); it can cause people to interpret problematic actions and false statements made by their preferred candidates in ways that are favorable to the candidate (Berinsky 2017; Nyhan and Reifler 2010, 2017; Swire et al. 2017; Westen et al. 2006); and it can cause people to view bad behavior in a favorable light (Valdesolo and DeSteno 2007). Yet more recent research casts doubt on the extent to which information is interpreted through a partisan lens (Nyhan et al. 2017; Wood and Porter

2016). Moreover, if partisans always avoid negative information about their candidate, or they always interpret damaging information in favorable terms, this cannot explain why lying demagogues sometimes *do not* appear to be authentically appealing to their constituencies. Furthermore, if partisanship causes supporters to see all blemishes as beautiful, this cannot account for key aspects of how Americans perceived the 2016 presidential candidates. These aspects are captured in three results drawn from a post-election survey, which we present in the Appendix: most Trump supporters recognized one of his most notorious lies as false; Trump supporters nevertheless saw him as highly authentic; and Clinton supporters did not see Clinton as authentic, but instead emphasized other positive attributes such as her competence. These results are inconsistent with a simple theory of motivated reasoning, whereby partisans see all of their candidate's blemishes as beautiful.

As developed in the next section, we argue that a particular set of social and political conditions must be in place for the lying demagogue to appear authentically appealing to his constituency. In short, if that constituency feels its interests are not being served by a political establishment that purports to represent it fairly, a lying demagogue can appear as a distinctively *authentic champion* of its interests. As first noted by Lipset (1959; cf. Judis 2016), such a "crisis of legitimacy" can emerge under at least two conditions: (1) when one or more social groups are experiencing what we call a "representation crisis" because the political establishment does not appear to govern on its behalf; and (2) when an incumbent group is experiencing a "power-devaluation crisis" because the political establishment is favoring new social groups over established groups (McVeigh 1999, 2009; cf. Gusfield 1986; Hofstadter 1955; Lipset 1959). These scenarios broadly reflect the basis for populist ideologies (Bonikowski and Gidron 2016a:1595–96) that promote a "politics of resentment" (Cramer 2016), whereby the aggrieved constituency comes to believe that the establishment's claim to

represent the interests of the "real people" (Müller 2016) belies an ulterior agenda they feel powerless to stop (Judis 2016). As such, a candidate who engages in lying demagoguery can be perceived as bravely speaking a deep and otherwise suppressed truth. By flagrantly violating norms on which the establishment insists, and thereby earning the opprobrium of this establishment, the candidate appears highly committed to the interests of her constituency (Kim 2017). By contrast, an earnest opposition candidate seems less authentic. Although such a candidate may be more likable or perceived to be more competent, it may be unclear whether he truly opposes the injustice that is said to have permeated the established political system.

After developing our theory, we report on two experiments that validate the theory. In each experiment, online participants were manipulated to see themselves as members of one or another social category, each of which was represented by a candidate in a fictive college government election. The key issue in each election was whether there should be a campus-wide ban on alcohol. Under some conditions, the anti-ban candidate tells the truth in his criticism of the research that is used to justify the ban; in others, the candidate lies and makes a demagogic, misogynistic statement. A key result is that subjects who were manipulated to see themselves as members of the same social category as the pro-ban candidate never regarded the anti-ban candidate as authentic. In addition, among participants who saw themselves as members of the anti-ban candidate's social category, the lying demagogue was perceived as authentic only under some conditions—when there was a "crisis of legitimacy." We conclude by discussing how mere partisan identification is insufficient to explain the authentic appeal of the lying demagogue, and that many factors to which partisan differences in perception and action are ascribed—culture, information access, gender, and ideology—are not necessary, but might be complementary to social and political structure. We also relate our results to the 2016 U.S. presidential election.

THEORY

We now lay out our theory in three steps. First, we clarify how it is logically possible for an individual to regard someone as authentic even though the person is known to be insincere—that is, to tell falsehoods deliberately. This appears inconsistent with the definition of authenticity whereby "someone (or something) is authentic to the extent that s/he (it) is what s/he (its producer) claims (it) to be" (see Hahl, Zuckerman, and Kim 2017).[7] This problem is resolved, however, when the type of lie is such that the speaker flagrantly violates the norm of upholding the difference between truth and falsehood (Frankfurt 2005). This takes us to the second step, which involves resolving the question of how it is logically possible to regard someone as authentic even though they continually violate publicly-held norms. This is more easily resolved, because past research demonstrates that public compliance with norms often masks the suppression of widespread private dissent (e.g., Centola, Willer, and Macy 2005; Kuran 1995; Prentice and Miller 1993; Wedeen 1999). This gap between public compliance and private dissent creates an opening for a demagogue to claim she is conveying a deeper truth and is the authentic champion of those whose voices have been muzzled by the established leadership. Finally, our theory addresses the social and political conditions under which the lying demagogue's claim will have persuasive power. We argue that the authentic appeal of the lying demagogue is rooted in the conditions identified by Lipset (1959, 1960) as responsible for a "crisis of legitimacy" with respect to a particular constituency. Under such conditions, the lying demagogue will seem more authentic in her claims to be champion of this constituency if she is willing to burn her bridge to acceptability in the political establishment.

Two Kinds of Lies

Let us first define a *lie* as a statement that (1) is couched in the form of an assertion of objective fact but is in fact false; and (2) is asserted even though the speaker knows it is false. A *liar* would then be someone who, because he has told lies repeatedly, has acquired a reputation for telling lies. As noted in the introduction, it would seem illogical for anyone to trust a liar to be their agent, and this clearly extends to the case of politicians. To be sure, lying can be unproblematic, and even preferable, when the lie is a "white lie" or a "prosocial lie" (Levine and Schweitzer 2015), whereby the speaker and the listener share an understanding that a larger shared purpose is better served by concealing or distorting the truth. In addition, political leaders may be forgiven if a false justification for a decision can later be explained as having been necessary to mobilize support for an action that would have been unpopular if discussed openly at the time (Mearsheimer 2010). But what about when a politician makes statements that are known to be false at the time and that do not conceal any problematic truths? In short, such politicians would seem insincere and therefore inauthentic; and this inauthenticity would seem to disqualify them as viable electoral choices.

But let us now make a further conceptual distinction between two ideal-types of lies, one we will call a "special-access lie" and one we will call a "common-knowledge lie." Figure 1 visually represents this distinction. A special-access lie is a deliberately false statement based on facts about which the speaker is thought to have special access. A good example of such a lie is Bill Clinton's notorious false claim that he "did not have sexual relations with that woman" (i.e., Monica Lewinsky). If the liar is a political candidate, the lie could pertain to her past actions, her relationships, or her future commitments. Another good example is George H. W. Bush's famous false campaign promise, "Read my lips: no new taxes."[8] Generally speaking, when political candidates are accused of being liars, these are the types of lies they are alleged to have told. And it is often the case that the truth or falsehood is not revealed until after the political campaign is over. Accordingly, a basic

Figure 1. Conceptual Distinction between Two Ideal-Types of Lies
Note: While we make a conceptual distinction between the two ideal-types of lies, there is a spectrum between the two into which each lie fits, as visually represented in this figure.

reason why politicians tell such lies is that they are gambling that their falsehood will never be uncovered—perhaps because they will have political influence over those who would uncover the lie (Davis and Ferrantino 1996; McGraw 1998). Such a politician is indirectly *reinforcing* the norm that speakers should make true statements and avoid false ones; the implicit claim is that the truth is important and her statement is true.

A common-knowledge lie is quite different. This is a false assertion about facts to which the speaker *has no special access*. Donald Trump told many special-access lies during the U.S. presidential campaign and afterward (e.g., his claim that he had never done business with "the Russians"), but his lies are distinctive for including so many common-knowledge lies. For instance, Trump often pointed to information that was supposedly in the public domain to support his claims, even if it was easily demonstrable that such supporting evidence did not exist (e.g., his claim that his election victory was "the biggest electoral college win since Ronald Reagan," or his claims regarding the size of the crowd at his inauguration). As such, the

ideal-typical case of this type of lie is one in which the speaker not only knows the statement is false, but she knows her listeners also know that she knows the statement is false; it is thus common knowledge that the statement is false. Accordingly, the findings presented in the Appendix indicate that the vast majority of Trump supporters did not think his claim that the Chinese invented the concept of climate change was true.

The distinction between special-access and common-knowledge lies is an analytic one; many lies (e.g., Hillary Clinton's lie that "I never sent nor received any email that was marked classified") may fall somewhere between the polar cases. But the distinction is useful because it clarifies what is at stake. In particular, whereas the speaker of a special-access lie is implicitly upholding the norm of truth-telling, the common-knowledge liar is implicitly attacking this norm. Following Frankfurt (2005), such a liar is a type of "bullshit artist": he is publicly challenging truth as a prescriptive norm. Indeed, although it may be possible to signal that one is engaged in bullshit artistry even while telling a special-access lie (perhaps the manner by which the

lie is told conveys a lack of seriousness about the truth-telling norm), the challenge is much clearer when it is common knowledge that the statement is false. Insofar as a speaker seems capable of distinguishing between truth and falsehood and yet utters a statement everyone knows is false, the speaker is flouting the norm of truth-telling and inviting his listeners to endorse such violations. Indeed, listeners are complicit in the norm violation as long as they do not challenge him—and especially if they applaud him.

Demagoguery as Speaking Truth about Power

Our question has now been reduced to a more manageable one: How can someone who claims to promote the popular will be seen as authentic even though he breaks publicly-held norms, including those pertaining to distinguishing known truths from known falsehoods? This question is more manageable because past research indicates that public compliance with prescriptive norms often masks significant dissent (e.g., Kuran 1995; Prentice and Miller 1993; Wedeen 1999). A minority—or even a majority under some conditions (Centola et al. 2005)—may privately disagree with publicly-endorsed norms, but a group's established leadership (however formal or informal) tends to determine group membership, at least in part, based on compliance with such norms. Accordingly, individuals who seek social acceptance generally have an incentive to hide their deviance through public compliance and even to enforce a norm they do not privately endorse (Willer, Kuwabara, and Macy 2009; cf. Kim and Zuckerman Sivan 2017). Moreover, a common and powerful way to signal commitment to a group—and its leadership's legitimacy—is by publicly complying even though it is *known* that one does not privately endorse the norm (Kim 2017).

This gap between publicly-endorsed norms and private beliefs is the basis for our definition of demagoguery (see, e.g., Gustainis 1990; Mercieca 2015)—that is, an appeal to counter-normative beliefs (generally discussed as "prejudices") that are otherwise suppressed. The demagogue distinguishes himself in his willingness to bear the social consequences of publicly saying that the emperor is naked. He may not claim to speak "truth *to* power," but he claims to speak a larger truth *about* power—that social control (e.g., "political correctness" as described in Swaim [2016]) is suppressing significant private dissent.

Put differently, voters have two ways to determine a candidate's authenticity. One approach is to determine authenticity on the basis of the candidate's *sincerity* or *prosociality:* inauthentic candidates are those who tell lies or who violate publicly-endorsed norms. A second approach for determining authenticity is based on the implicit claim of the lying demagogue—that is, publicly-endorsed norms are imposed rather than freely chosen. The lying demagogue thus claims to be an *authentic champion* of those who are subject to social control by the established political leadership. Such a claim gains credence to the extent that two conditions hold: (1) there are in fact gaps between publicly-endorsed norms and privately-held beliefs, thus indicating that true opinions are being suppressed; and (2) the politician is willing to sacrifice his acceptance by the establishment. Viewed this way, each method of determining authenticity is consistent with previous work that shows audiences tend to attribute authenticity to a person who is publicly willing to "assume responsibility for his or her actions, and makes explicit values-based choices concerning those actions and appearances rather than accepting pre-programmed or socially imposed values and actions" (Carroll and Wheaton 2009:261).[9] Yet the actions of each type of authentic actor are clearly in opposition to each other, with respect to upholding establishment norms. In fact, by the "authentic champion" logic, the more dramatic the departure from the norms the establishment uses to determine acceptability, the more credible are the lying demagogue's claims to represent those who see such norms as instruments of social control.

Figure 2. Visual Representation of "Representation Crisis"

Crises of Legitimacy Pave the Demagogue's Way

If there are two alternative ways to interpret the same facts and conclude that a political candidate is authentic—one based on sincerity/prosociality and one based on authentic championhood—this raises the question of which will be chosen. The literature on motivated reasoning (Kunda 1990) suggests this will depend on two factors: whether a voter's interest is better served by one interpretation or the other; and whether that interpretation plausibly fits the available evidence. More specifically, as relates to the question at hand, we argue that these factors will vary with (1) the social category with which a voter identifies; and (2) whether the political system may be perceived as suffering from a "crisis of legitimacy" (Lipset 1959, 1960; for a review, see Mast 2017) with respect to that social category.

Lipset's (1960:78) delineation of two characteristic types of legitimacy crisis is helpful for fleshing out the logic and providing two different contexts in which to develop and test our theory. What we will call a *representation crisis* occurs when "[not] all the major groups in society . . . have access to the political system." And what we will call a *power-devaluation crisis* occurs when "the status of major conservative institutions is threatened during [a] period of structural change."

A representation crisis is straightforward in that it is the basis for classic populist appeals (for a review, see Bonikowski and Gidron 2016b). It occurs when established political leaders claim to govern on behalf of all citizens but in fact are believed to pursue their own interests or that of an incumbent social category—that is, a group that has enjoyed more rights or resources in the past. It is understandable why members of other social categories would feel aggrieved under those conditions, especially if established political leaders claim that the government serves all members of society. In short, the government seems illegitimate because it promotes democratic norms that it does not in fact uphold. Figure 2 depicts this type of crisis of legitimacy. Judis (2016:72) characterizes this as a "dyadic" socio-political dynamic because two actors are involved: a group who are outsiders, in that they do not feel they are being served by the political establishment (but who may regard themselves as the "silent majority"), and an incumbent group that controls the establishment. Two examples from U.S. history of populist movements that claimed a representation crisis are (Louisiana politician) Huey Long's "share our wealth" challenge to Franklin D. Roosevelt's early administration, and the populist movement's campaign for "free silver" in the last decade of the nineteenth century (Judis 2016).

It is clear why a representation crisis breeds conditions where the lying demagogue might seem like an authentic champion. By

Figure 3. Visual Representation of "Power-Devaluation Crisis"

implicitly arguing that publicly-endorsed norms belie significant private dissent, the demagogue is signaling to his constituency that he can serve as an effective voice.[10] Moreover, the greater his willingness to antagonize the establishment by making himself *persona non grata,* the more credible is his claim to be his constituency's leader. His flagrant violation of norms (including that of truth-telling; see Judis 2016:72–73) makes him odious to the establishment, someone from whom they must distance themselves lest they be tainted by scandal (Adut 2008). But this very need by the establishment to distance itself from the lying demagogue lends credibility to his claim to be an authentic champion for those who feel disenfranchised by that establishment. By contrast, someone who does not flagrantly violate publicly-endorsed norms should not provoke the same negative reaction from the establishment and thus seems less obviously committed to challenging it.

The logic of power-devaluation crises enables lying demagoguery in the same basic manner as representation crises, but a distinct socio-political dynamic is at work. In Judis's (2016) analysis, and as depicted in Figure 3, these crises involve three groups: (1) a political establishment; (2) an incumbent group who sees itself as the "real people" (Müller 2016) but has been losing power; and (3) a group of erstwhile outsiders who are rising

and whom the incumbent group views as being unfairly favored by the establishment.

Research on this type of crisis began in the mid-1950s with Hofstadter's (1955) and Lipset's (1959) analyses of "status politics." This idea was developed further by Gusfield (1986) in his analysis of the temperance movement. This literature focused on political movements that were driven by a sense of injustice but were often focused on symbolic issues rather than material ones (e.g., the legality of alcohol use) and emerged from a middle-class constituency (Ranulf 1964). The common denominator was a sense that the erstwhile higher-status category was losing status relative to groups that had formerly been even lower status. More recently, McVeigh's (1999, 2009) analysis of the Ku Klux Klan in the 1920s and the Tea Party after 2008 suggests that such conservative movements are driven by a mix of status, economic, and political changes that sow fear of power-devaluation among those who previously felt they were part of the establishment. This sentiment is due not simply to the fact that their social category is falling in power, but that upstart social categories, in such groups' views, are being unjustly favored by the establishment. For example, the Ku Klux Klan of the 1920s alleged that the government was beholden to corporate interests that were imposing unfair competition on them by inviting masses of unskilled immigrants

(McVeigh 2009), and many of Donald Trump's supporters saw the Federal government as illegitimate because it helped nonwhites and immigrants "jump the queue" through affirmative action programs (Hochschild 2016; see also Gest 2016; Williams 2017; Wood 2017).

Such a power-devaluation crisis thus creates conditions under which a traditionalist or right-wing lying demagogue should have authentic appeal. The logic is the same as in a representation crisis, but now the demagogue is challenging *new norms* rather than existing ones, and he is arguing that the establishment is illegitimate because it has betrayed the values and interests of an incumbent group that had previously held sway for appropriate reasons. Again, the demagogue will seem more of an authentic champion insofar as her norm-breaking induces the (new) establishment to denigrate her, thus making her seem more committed to the aggrieved constituency than is a candidate who does not flagrantly break (the new) norms.

The upshot is that under either type of crisis of legitimacy, what might seem from the outside to be an irrational assessment, whereby one attributes authenticity to a liar and publicmindedness to a norm-breaker, is in fact a reasonable consequence of socio-political position and motivated reasoning. We argue that when voters identify with an "aggrieved" social category—that is, one whose members see themselves as unfairly treated by the political establishment, they will be more motivated to view demagogic falsehoods from a candidate claiming to serve them as gestures of symbolic protest against the dominant group. When this happens, such voters will view the candidate making these statements as more authentic than would people in other social categories.

The most general statement of our argument may be summarized as follows:

> **Proposition:** Voters who identify with social category X will attribute greater authenticity to a lying demagogue (relative to a candidate who is not a lying demagogue) who represents X insofar as members of X feel

aggrieved due to at least one type of legitimacy crisis:

> *Representation crisis:* X is an outsider social category and its members perceive the political establishment as serving incumbents at the expense of the public welfare.

> *Power-devaluation crisis:* X is an incumbent social category and its members perceive the political establishment as unfairly favoring an outsider category Y.

EMPIRICAL OVERVIEW: WHEN IS A LYING DEMAGOGUE PERCEIVED TO BE AUTHENTIC?

We now lay out the architecture of the two experiments that test our theoretical proposition. Experiments are particularly suitable as an empirical method here because they allow us to validate our proposed mechanism and to exclude other processes (e.g., culture, media exposure, gender) that may influence how candidates are perceived (see discussion below). In addition, by designing experiments on simulated conditions, we can make progress in understanding the authentic appeal of the lying demagogue outside the charged atmosphere of the 2016 presidential election and its aftermath.

Recruitment

For Study 1 (representation crisis), conducted in January 2017, we recruited 424 unique participants through Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk) tool. For Study 2 (power-devaluation crisis), conducted in April 2017, we recruited 400 unique participants. We made sure no one who participated in Study 1 could participate in Study 2. Our goal was to include 50 participants for each cell (about 400 per study). Previous research on the use of MTurk suggests that because of the inherent noise on this platform, reliable results can be obtained only

when each experimental condition contains at least 50 observations (Bartneck et al. 2015). Collecting too many observations might increase the likelihood of an overpowered study (i.e., results are deemed significant statistically, but only because of the large number of observations), so we kept the number of participants close to the minimum of 50 per condition suggested by previous work.

MTurk has been used widely in experimental research and has been found to provide a subject pool that is slightly more educated and technologically savvy than the national average (Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz 2012; Buhrmester, Kwang, and Gosling 2011). We were looking for participants who reflected this general audience, rather than an audience with a specific set of knowledge or attitudes. MTurk provides access to many potential participants who meet such criteria and is thus an appropriate setting to gauge how people's perceptions are formed based on realistic scenarios of which participants often have first-hand social knowledge (Parigi, Santana, and Cook 2017). One of the downsides of MTurk, however, is the higher monitoring risk compared to university laboratory settings. In particular, there is a risk that some participants do not pay as close attention to the task as would participants in a lab with visible monitoring. This potentially limits the effect of a manipulation. To confirm that our participants paid close enough attention to the task, we asked them a series of attention questions about information presented on a previous screen (Mason and Suri 2012). About 10 percent of our sample (79 of 824) got at least one attention-check question wrong. Each time this occurred, they were told the correct answer to reinforce the information they were meant to digest. The results presented here include all participants but are robust to excluding those who got at least one question wrong.

Procedure

Each of the two experiments asked a study participant to assess a pair of candidates who were supposedly competing in a college campus election where a campus ban on alcohol was a hotly contested issue.[11] Each study sought to manipulate (a) whether a participant identifies with the incumbent or outsider category, (b) whether there is a legitimacy crisis, and (c) whether the "anti-alcohol-ban" candidate (who is an outsider in Study 1 and an incumbent in Study 2) does or does not make statements that contain common-knowledge lies and are demagogic in nature.[12] Figure 4 visually represents each manipulation and the overall flow of each experiment. The series of manipulations resulted in eight conditions per study: 2 (incumbent/outsider) × 2 (legitimacy crisis/no crisis) × 2 (anti-ban candidate is a lying demagogue/not). The key difference between the two experiments pertains to the type of legitimacy crisis manipulated (b): in the first experiment, there is a representation crisis where the political establishment claims to govern on behalf of all citizens but appears to pursue its own interest or that of an incumbent social category (as illustrated in Figure 2); in the second experiment, there is a power-devaluation crisis, where the political establishment appears to favor an "outsider" upstart social category (as illustrated in Figure 3).

Upon entering each experiment, participants were told they would take part in a survey that was "designed to find out how best to cooperate with college students who are running for positions in the student government." They were further told they would be given information "about an election campaign for positions in the student government" and asked for "your opinions on who you would vote for." We will now lay out the manipulations. Manipulations (a) and (c) were identical for both experiments but the manipulation for element (b)—the legitimacy crisis manipulation—was specific to each experiment.

(a) Outsider/incumbent group manipulation. Each experiment began with a version of the "Klee and Kandinsky test" often used in the minimal group paradigm to randomly assign participants to one of two (meaningless) types labeled Q2 and S2 (e.g., Hahl and Zuckerman 2014; Hahl et al. 2017;

Figure 4. Overview and Flow of Two Studies
Note: This diagram portrays the layout of both studies. The key difference between the two studies is the manipulation in (b): In Study 1, the crisis of legitimacy is a "representation crisis" and the anti-alcohol-ban candidate is from an outsider social category (Q2); in Study 2, the crisis is a "power-devaluation crisis" and the anti-alcohol-ban candidate is from an incumbent social category (Q2). In both studies, the anti-alcohol-ban candidate can appear either as a lying demagogue or as a "baseline" candidate who neither lies nor makes a demagogic statement. Note that while participants are randomly assigned to be either Q2-type or S2-type, every participant evaluates both the Q2-type candidate and the S2-type candidate.

Ridgeway and Correll 2006; Tajfel et al. 1971; Yamagishi and Kiyonari 2000). To do this, participants were told they would first take a test that "has been proven by numerous studies to divide the world evenly based on personality type, which we will label Q2 and S2." Participants were also told that "when students first enter this college, they also take a personality type test during orientation" and "based on the selections and preferences you display, the test will reveal whether you are a 'Q2' or 'S2.'" Participants then ranked the Klee and Kandinsky paintings and were told their response patterns indicate they are an S2 or a Q2. Participants did not know the process was actually random.

In the course of the manipulation (b) (see below), participants found out that one of the candidates was an S2 personality type and another was a Q2 personality type, thereby creating a link between each study participant and one of the two candidates. Participants were told that to protect students' anonymity, the candidates are referred to as "Q2-type" and

"S2-type" candidates throughout the vignette. Via the link to the personality type of the candidate, participants were meant to see themselves as being on one or another side of the major issue in the college election: the student government's stance for or against banning alcohol on campus. In Study 1, the Q2 (incumbent) candidate was in favor of maintaining a ban that had been imposed earlier that year by the college in coordination with the student government; the S2 (outsider) candidate was against the ban. In Study 2, this was reversed: the Q2 (incumbent) candidate was against a *proposed* ban, whereas the S2 (outsider) candidate expressed support for such a ban. Participants in each study thus learned that members of their "type" were on one or another side of a hotly contested political issue.

It is important to underline how this manipulation creates a form of partisanship that is orthogonal to the partisan divide in contemporary U.S. politics. Previous studies using this experimental paradigm consistently show that (random) assignment to a "type"

(S2 or Q2) induces stronger identification to that type over the course of an experiment (e.g., Hahl and Zuckerman 2014; Hahl et al. 2017; Ridgeway and Correll 2006; Tajfel et al. 1971; Yamagishi and Kiyonari 2000). Of course, partisanship outside the lab carries more depth than the "thin" association we elicit here. But this thinness is an advantage: it allows for a conservative test of the idea that membership in a social category experiencing a legitimacy crisis may be sufficient for individuals to perceive a standard bearer for that category as an authentic champion when he engages in lying demagoguery.

(b) Crises of legitimacy manipulations. After participants were assigned to a "personality type" (Q2 or S2), they were randomly assigned to one of two legitimacy crisis conditions in each study. Each study had a different type of legitimacy crisis (Study 1: representation crisis; Study 2: power-devaluation crisis) and its own corresponding *no crisis* condition. The next sections describe each of the two legitimacy crisis manipulations; it is important to remember that each participant was exposed to only one of these conditions.

Study 1: Representation Crisis Manipulation

This manipulation was meant to elicit the perception that the Q2-type (incumbent) candidate either was taking advantage of his position and not concerned about others (*representation crisis* conditions) or was motivated to do his job and help others out of genuine pro-social concern (*no representation crisis* conditions). To manipulate participants to recognize a representation crisis, the Q2-type (incumbent) candidate was described as having benefited personally from network connections related to his position in the incumbent group: "The student government president often meets with college administrators and board members. These connections have sometimes been known to be helpful for a student's future career."

Furthermore, participants were told about a time when this particular Q2-type (incumbent) candidate was featured in the student newspaper for having ignored a student's request for assistance with securing financial aid. Participants learned that a reporter had followed up on the request: "The reporter found that when the Q2-type candidate received the request, he ignored it because it was not part of his responsibility. The issue was never resolved." Finally, participants in the *representation crisis* conditions were told that individuals supporting the S2-type (outsider) candidate expressed "concern that the debate would be unfair, since the moderator was an administrator and knew the Q2-type candidate."[13]

By contrast, participants in the *no representation crisis* conditions were told that other Q2-type (incumbent) students who had held the office of president in the past "often give up their own free time to represent the students and the community" and "it has been estimated that someone in this role in the student government spends more than 300 hours per semester on top of school work and other activities." Furthermore, in contrast to the reporter's story in the *representation crisis* conditions, in the *no representation crisis* conditions participants were told that the Q2-type (incumbent) candidate was featured in a story in which he went out of his way to help a student who had requested help from the student government: "The reporter found that when the Q2-type candidate received the request, he brought the case to a confidential meeting with the dean of the college and requested that this issue be resolved even though it was not part of his responsibility." Finally, participants were also told that the Q2-type (incumbent) candidate was surprised about the newspaper coverage, having neither initiated it nor been aware that the reporter had known about the story.

Several key pieces of information did not vary across conditions. In particular, participants in both the *representation crisis* and *no representation crisis* conditions were informed that the S2-type candidate had never

served nor even run for student government in the past, but "he had been the head of the biggest fraternity on campus, one that was well known (and notorious among college administrators) for its rambunctious culture and wild parties." In addition, participants in all conditions were told that this year's student government election had attracted more attention than usual because it "was the first student government election since the college adopted a policy to ban alcohol on campus." Finally, participants in all conditions learned that the Q2-type candidate was in favor of maintaining the alcohol ban, whereas the S2-type candidate was against the ban.

Study 2: Power-Devaluation Crisis Manipulation

This manipulation was meant to elicit the belief among participants that the college administration (i.e., establishment) was unfairly favoring the upstart S2-type (outsider) social category. Participants in both the *power-devaluation crisis* conditions and the *no power-devaluation crisis* conditions were first told that this election "was the first student government election since the college had announced that it would consider banning alcohol on campus." Participants in the *power-devaluation crisis* conditions were then told that "as publicity over sexual assault on college campuses increased last year, several protests promoting the ban received attention in the national media, and the recently hired dean of students responded by suggesting that the administration would now support a ban." Participants in the *power-devaluation crisis* conditions were also told that "there was growing resentment among some students towards the college administration for being willing to consider an alcohol ban" and "an open letter from a group of influential alumni accused the administration of 'cravenly giving into a group of newcomers who don't respect the college's proud traditions.'" Finally, these participants were told that "the new dean of students responded with an open letter to the community saying, 'Sometimes our traditions have to change when the safety of our students is

at risk.'" All of these statements point to increased concern that the college administration was supporting the upstart S2-type (outsider) social category represented by the pro-alcohol-ban candidate, despite resentment by those who identify with the campus traditions.

By contrast, participants randomly assigned to the *no power-devaluation crisis* conditions were told that the election "was the first student government election since the question of a campus ban on alcohol had become a major issue" but "the dean of students suggested that he did not expect a change in school traditions around alcohol in the foreseeable future." Furthermore, participants in these conditions were told that "an open letter from a group of influential alumni emphasized how much they cherish the 'college's proud traditions' and they praised the college administration for 'honoring those traditions.'" Finally, participants were told that "the dean of students responded with an open letter to the community saying, 'We value our traditions and should protect them against short-term changes in popular culture.'" In contrast to the *power-devaluation crisis* conditions, the S2-type (outsider) candidate in the *no power-devaluation crisis* conditions was not shown any favor by the college administration (establishment). In fact, the establishment seemed to be on the side of the Q2-type (incumbent) social category, represented by the candidate who advocated for the status quo and no alcohol ban.

(c) Lying demagogue/baseline candidate manipulation. The final manipulation in each study was used to establish whether the anti-alcohol-ban candidate made a false demagogic statement. In each study, participants were told that support for the alcohol ban derived in part from recent "academic research [performed] by Professors Robert Nielsen and Cynthia Jordan . . . which showed that when colleges allowed alcohol on campus, incidences [sic] of sexual assault increased significantly." This research is fictional. This manipulation was followed by a set of attention-check questions used to reinforce the authors' names (i.e., one was male and one was

female) and whether the study had been reviewed and approved for publication by other scholars in the field. This information formed the basis for statements made in a debate between the two candidates during the campaign.

Participants were then informed that the pro-alcohol-ban candidate was randomly picked to speak first in the debate; he had stated, "the college has obligations to protect its students from sexual assault . . . on campus"; he had cited the research; and he had concluded that it therefore "makes good sense to ban alcohol on campus." Next, participants randomly assigned to the *baseline* conditions were told that the anti-alcohol-ban candidate said, "We really don't know if there is a link between alcohol and sexual assault. The research that influenced this policy was not even published in a peer-reviewed journal. We can't be so quick to rely on it, and we need to allow alcohol on campus."

One key difference between the *baseline* and *lying demagogue* conditions was that in the former participants were informed that the research *had indeed not yet been published* in a peer-reviewed journal, whereas in the latter, participants were told that the research *had in fact already been published* in a peer-reviewed journal, thus rendering the anti-alcohol-ban candidate's statement a common-knowledge lie. In addition, participants in the *lying demagogue* conditions were informed that the anti-alcohol-ban candidate added a demagogic, misogynistic comment to the statement made in the *baseline* conditions: "Plus, the research that influenced the policy was conducted by two professors—obviously with a radical feminist agenda—who hate the idea that sometimes girls just want to be girls and a little alcohol helps."[14] The *lying demagogue* conditions thus include both a common-knowledge lie and a misogynistic statement, each of which constitutes a clearly deliberate norm violation.[15]

After these descriptions, participants were asked a series of attention-check questions about the authorship of the articles, the dean's stance on the college's traditions, and alumni

reaction to a potential alcohol ban. As noted earlier, these questions reinforce the manipulations as well as check for attention.

Measures

After the last set of attention-check questions, all participants were told that they were "randomly assigned to first evaluate the S2-type candidate." Participants were then asked to rate on a scale of 1 (low) to 7 (high) the "S2-type candidate on measures of" different attributes, presented in randomly sorted order. One of these measures was authenticity. The others were competence, prestige, genuineness, sincerity, considerateness, warmth, and likability.

In contrast to previous research on authenticity (e.g., Hahl and Zuckerman 2014; Hahl et al. 2017), we used a single authenticity item, rather than a scale combining authenticity, genuineness, and sincerity to operationalize the perception of authenticity. As reviewed earlier, one approach to determine authenticity is based on sincerity and prosociality; a second approach is that of the authentic champion who lies while proclaiming a deeper truth about injustice. This theoretical rationale for separating perceptions of authenticity from perceptions of sincerity is empirically validated in the post-election survey (see the Appendix), where Trump's authenticity was perceived by his supporters to be significantly greater than his sincerity or considerateness. Therefore, we use the single authenticity item to measure participants' perceptions of authenticity in analysis of our experimental data. We report how perceptions of authenticity are related to perceptions of considerateness after describing the main results of both studies.

Given this experimental architecture, our Proposition can be translated into four specific hypotheses, which are tested in Study 1 in the context of a representation crisis, and in Study 2 in the context of a power-devaluation crisis:

> *Hypothesis 1:* Where there is a *crisis of legitimacy* that pertains to the social category of the anti-alcohol-ban candidate, study participants

who are in this social category and who view the *lying demagogue* version of the candidate will perceive the anti-alcohol-ban candidate as *more authentic* than do otherwise comparable participants who view a *baseline* version of the candidate (i.e., one who does not lie or engage in demagoguery).

Hypothesis 2: Where there is *no crisis of legitimacy* that pertains to the social category of the anti-alcohol-ban candidate, study participants who are in this social category and who view the *lying demagogue* version of the candidate will perceive the anti-alcohol-ban candidate as *less authentic* than do otherwise comparable participants who view a *baseline* version of the candidate (i.e., one who does not lie or engage in demagoguery).

Hypothesis 3: Study participants who are in the same category as the anti-alcohol-ban candidate and where there is a *crisis of legitimacy* with respect to that category will *perceive the lying demagogue* version of this candidate as *more authentic* than will otherwise comparable study participants in conditions where *there is no crisis of legitimacy* with respect to their category.

Hypothesis 4: Where there is a *crisis of legitimacy* that pertains to the social category of the anti-alcohol-ban candidate, *study participants who are in the same category* as this *anti-alcohol-ban candidate* will perceive the *lying demagogue* version of this candidate as *more authentic* than do study participants who are otherwise comparable but are in the category of the *pro-alcohol-ban candidate.*

Before discussing the results, it is worth noting the factors we are excluding from our experiments, including those that some argue were important in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. First, by presenting both candidates as male, we set aside the possibility that female candidates have particular challenges in being regarded as authentic (but see the Appendix concerning Hillary Clinton's perceived authenticity). In addition, random assignment to the various conditions means there should be no connection between study participants' social category and their gender, cultural milieu, political affiliation (i.e., whether they voted for Trump or Clinton), or

language patterns (relevant if different definitions of authenticity might be used). Finally, because members of different social categories within an experimental condition had access to exactly the same information, this eliminates the possibility that differential exposure to information is responsible for the effects we observe.

MAIN RESULTS

Study 1: Representation Crisis Study

All four hypotheses were validated in Study 1, where the anti-alcohol-ban candidate was an outsider and the key conditions were those inducing a representation crisis involving the social category (S2) of that candidate. Figure 5 shows the mean values and comparisons for all conditions. In line with Hypothesis 1, participants randomly assigned to the *outsider/ representation crisis/lying demagogue* condition ($n = 54$; mean = 5.61) attributed substantially more authenticity (Mann-Whitney z-score = 7.04; $p < .001$) to the anti-alcohol-ban candidate than did participants randomly assigned to the *outsider/representation crisis/ baseline* condition ($n = 53$; mean = 3.68).[16] That is, when there is a representation crisis involving an outsider social category, a lying demagogue representing that category appears more authentic to members of that category than does a candidate who refrains from lying and demagoguery.

By contrast, and in line with Hypothesis 2, participants randomly assigned to the *outsider/no crisis/lying demagogue* condition ($n = 63$; mean = 3.46) attributed substantially less authenticity (z-score = 2.98; $p < .01$) to the anti-alcohol-ban candidate than did participants randomly assigned to the *outsider/ no crisis/baseline* condition ($n = 54$; mean = 4.46). Moreover, and in line with Hypothesis 3, participants randomly assigned to the *outsider/representation crisis/lying demagogue* condition ($n = 54$; mean = 5.61) attributed substantially more authenticity (z-score = 6.22; $p < .001$) to the anti-alcohol-ban candidate than did participants randomly assigned to the *outsider/no crisis/lying demagogue*

Figure 5. Study 1: Perceived Authenticity of the S2-Type (Outsider) Candidate
Note: The left-most four bars represent perceptions from participants randomly assigned to S2-type (thus associating themselves with the S2-type candidate); the right-most four bars represent the same from participants in Q2-type (thus not associating themselves with the S2-type candidate). The tests for Hypotheses 1 and 2 are shown graphically. The other two comparisons show that the authenticity-enhancing effect of lying demagoguery in the crisis conditions pertains only to those who identify themselves with the lying demagogue (i.e., S2-type), since there is no evidence that the lying demagogue appears any more authentic than the baseline candidate. Hypothesis 3 is validated through the comparison of results between the outsider/crisis/lying demagogue condition and the outsider/no crisis/lying demagogue condition; Hypothesis 4 is validated through the comparison between the outsider/crisis/lying demagogue condition and the incumbent/crisis/lying demagogue condition. Both of those tests provide statistically significant results as well, as reported in the text.

condition ($n = 63$; mean = 3.46). These results confirm that the authenticity-enhancing effect of lying demagoguery is present only when a legitimacy crisis provides motivation for members of an aggrieved outsider social category to respond to the appeal of a lying demagogue. Otherwise, the lying demagogue appears *less authentic* than a candidate who tells the truth and refrains from demagoguery, even to the candidate's natural constituency.

Finally, and in line with Hypothesis 4, participants randomly assigned to the *outsider/representation crisis/lying demagogue* condition ($n = 54$; mean = 5.61) attributed more authenticity (z-score = 2.98; $p < .01$) to the anti-alcohol-ban candidate than did participants randomly assigned to the *incumbent/*

representation crisis/lying demagogue condition ($n = 52$; mean = 4.06). Thus, a legitimacy crisis is necessary but not sufficient for the lying demagogue to be perceived as authentic; the perceiver must also be a member of the outsider social category that the lying demagogue represents.

Study 2: Power-Devaluation Crisis Study

All four hypotheses were also validated in Study 2, where the anti-alcohol-ban candidate was a political incumbent and the key conditions were those inducing a power-devaluation crisis involving the social category (Q2) of that candidate. Figure 6 shows the mean

Figure 6. Study 2: Perceived Authenticity of the Q2-Type (Incumbent) Candidate
Note: The left-most four bars represent perceptions from participants randomly assigned to Q2-type (thus associating themselves with the Q2-type candidate); the right-most four bars represent the same from participants in S2-type (thus not associating themselves with the Q2-type candidate). The tests for Hypotheses 1 and 2 are shown graphically. The other two comparisons show that the authenticity-enhancing effect of lying demagoguery in the crisis conditions pertains only to those who identify themselves with the lying demagogue (i.e., Q2-type), since the lying demagogue does not appear any more authentic than the baseline candidate (in fact, significantly less authentic, as shown). Hypothesis 3 is validated through the comparison of results between the incumbent/crisis/lying demagogue condition and the incumbent/no crisis/lying demagogue condition; Hypothesis 4 is validated through the comparison between the incumbent/crisis/lying demagogue condition and the outsider/crisis/lying demagogue condition. Both of those tests provide statistically significant results as well, as reported in the text.

values and comparisons for all conditions. In line with Hypothesis 1, participants randomly assigned to the *incumbent/power-devaluation crisis/lying demagogue* condition ($n = 54$; mean = 5.22) saw the anti-alcohol-ban candidate as more authentic (z-score = 2.06; $p < .05$) than did participants who were randomly assigned to the *incumbent/power-devaluation crisis/baseline* condition ($n = 52$; mean = 4.71). Thus, when there is a power-devaluation crisis involving an incumbent social category, a lying demagogue representing that category appears more authentic to members of that category than does a candidate who refrains from lying or demagoguery.

By contrast, and in line with Hypothesis 2, participants randomly assigned to the *incumbent/no crisis/lying demagogue* condition ($n = $ 53; mean = 3.68) attributed less authenticity (z-score = 3.13; $p < .01$) to the anti-alcohol-ban candidate than did participants who were randomly assigned to the *incumbent/no crisis/baseline* condition ($n = 50$; mean = 4.72). Moreover, and in line with Hypothesis 3, participants randomly assigned to the *incumbent/power-devaluation crisis/lying demagogue* condition ($n = 54$; mean = 5.22) attributed more authenticity (z-score = 4.50; $p < .001$) to the anti-alcohol-ban candidate than did participants randomly assigned to the *incumbent/no crisis/lying demagogue* condition ($n = 53$; mean = 3.68). These results reinforce the conclusion that the authenticity-enhancing effect of lying demagoguery is present only when a legitimacy crisis provides motivation for members of an aggrieved incumbent social

category to respond to the appeal of a lying demagogue. Otherwise, the lying demagogue appears *less authentic* than a candidate who tells the truth and refrains from demagoguery, even to the candidate's natural constituency.

Finally, and in line with Hypothesis 4, participants in the *incumbent/power-devaluation crisis/lying demagogue* condition ($n = 54$; mean = 5.22) attributed more authenticity (z-score = 3.99; $p < .001$) to the anti-alcohol-ban candidate than did participants in the *outsider/power-devaluation crisis/lying demagogue* condition ($n = 47$; mean = 3.78). Thus, we again see that a legitimacy crisis is necessary but not sufficient for the lying demagogue to be perceived as authentic; the perceiver must also be a member of the incumbent social category that the lying demagogue represents.

Discussion of Main Results

These studies validate our theory as to why and when a lying demagogue would be seen as more authentic than someone who neither lies nor engages in demagoguery. In each study, two conditions are jointly necessary for a lying demagogue to seem authentic to a set of voters: there must be a crisis of legitimacy, and these voters must be members of the aggrieved social category. In the context of a legitimacy crisis, aggrieved voters are motivated to interpret the act of lying demagoguery as a symbolic challenge to the seemingly illegitimate establishment. The candidate demonstrates he is an authentic champion by flouting norms this establishment holds dear. We have shown evidence of this effect in the two types of legitimacy crises first noted by Lipset (1959, 1960; cf. Judis 2016): a representation crisis and a power-devaluation crisis. In each case, the lying demagogue candidate is viewed as more authentic than a baseline candidate. This relationship is reversed when there is no legitimacy crisis: the candidate's natural constituents attribute *less authenticity* to the lying demagogue than to the baseline candidate in the absence of a legitimacy crisis. This demonstrates that mere partisan identification is

insufficient for voters to find a lying demagogue authentic. Furthermore, the lying demagogue is viewed as more authentic in the midst of this crisis than he would appear absent a crisis. Finally, voters who are not constituents of the lying demagogue never attribute more authenticity to such a candidate compared to a baseline candidate. Such voters do not have the necessary motivation to hear the lying demagogue's implicit message.

ROBUSTNESS CHECKS

Before concluding, we check the robustness of our results. One possible concern is that perceptions of authenticity are unrelated to electoral support. Our theory does not have clear implications for overall support because (1) such support should be determined by other perceptions of the candidate (e.g., their competence and prosociality) in addition to their perceived authenticity; and (2) study participants may have identified with the social categories represented by the candidates, but they were only asked to observe the election and not role play as if they were to vote in it. Nonetheless, it is instructive to compare the similarity of distributions in Figures 5 and 6 to that displayed in Figure 7, which shows variation by condition in mean answers to a seven-point item, "How enthusiastically do you think those who want to allow alcohol on campus will support the S2-type (for Study 1) / Q2-type (for Study 2) candidate?" Overall, especially in Study 1, participants expected that greater authenticity would be consistent with greater support. Note that in both studies, the lying demagogue is expected to win his natural constituency when there is a legitimacy crisis, but not when there is no crisis.

We now briefly consider two additional issues: (I) whether our experimental manipulation was sufficiently strong that it operated independent of study participants' gender and political identities; and (II) whether the authentic appeal of the lying demagogue is confined to authentic championhood, as we argued, or if it reflects a general tendency for aggrieved voters to view their candidate in a positive light.

Figure 7. Summary of Results on "Support"

Note: These results are based on all participants' responses to a seven-point item, "How enthusiastically do you think those who want to allow alcohol on campus will support the S2-type (for Study 1) / Q2-type (for Study 2) candidate?" The patterns for results on support are nearly identical to those shown on perceptions of authenticity. Study 2 is less consistent with the authenticity results than Study 1, but in all cases, when the lying demagogue candidate is in a legitimacy crisis, his support is higher than his baseline alternative. This is not the case when the legitimacy crisis is absent.

$*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.$

Robustness Check I: The Irrelevance of Gender and Trump/Clinton Support

There are good reasons to suppose that the results of our experiments may vary depending on study participants' gender and whether they voted for Trump or Clinton in the 2016 election. With regard to gender, one might hypothesize that women should be less likely to perceive a lying demagogue as authentic (when they are in the aggrieved social category in a legitimacy crisis), insofar as the lying demagogue's demagoguery included misogynistic statements or actions—as was

the case in our experiments. With regard to how study participants voted in the 2016 presidential election, one might suppose that the politically charged atmosphere of this election and its aftermath would have a significant effect on how study participants responded to the lying demagogue (relative to the baseline opposition candidate). In particular, insofar as the lying demagogue character most resembles Trump, and insofar as Trump voters are more likely to see themselves as members of an aggrieved social category suffering from a crisis of legitimacy, this would seem to imply that Trump supporters should

Figure 8. Study 1 Perceived Authenticity of the Anti-Alcohol-Ban Candidate by Subsample

Note: The same pattern of results appears for both men and women, and for both Trump supporters and Clinton supporters. All but two hypotheses (Hypothesis 2 for female subjects and Clinton voters) are supported within each subsample, although each subsample is fewer than 30 subjects. The results reported here are from Study 1; the results from Study 2 are substantively similar. $*p < .05$; $**p < .01$; $***p < .001$.

be more likely to perceive the lying dema-gogue as authentic. Popular culture and the media have also posited that Trump supporters might have backed him out of a predilection for a more authoritarian style (Vance 2016; Williams 2017), perhaps due to differences in culture or socialization. Observing differences across Trump and Clinton supporters in our study will help test this alternative.

In fact, however, as Figure 8 shows, the same pattern of results appears for both men and women, and for both Trump supporters and Clinton supporters.[17] This suggests that the motivation to see a lying demagogue as an authentic champion overrides erstwhile ten-dencies for women to penalize men for mak-ing misogynistic statements.[18] We also find that Clinton supporters and Trump supporters are essentially no different in their susceptibil-ity to the authentic appeal of the lying dema-gogue: had Clinton supporters been members of an aggrieved social category in a crisis of legitimacy, they too would apparently have responded as Trump supporters did. There-fore, our results are not driven by differences in participants' gender or political identities.

Robustness Check II: The Lying Demagogue as an Authentic Jerk

Whereas some research sees partisans as rein-terpreting all their candidate's flaws in a posi-tive light (e.g., Valdesolo and DeSteno 2007; Westen et al. 2006), we suggest instead that motivated reasoning is significantly con-strained by observable facts. The lying dema-gogue is perceived as an authentic champion by his aggrieved constituency not because they appreciate all aspects of his behavior, but because it is in fact quite plausible to see his behavior as an instance of bravely speaking truth about power. His behavior is directly *inconsistent,* however, with such valued attri-butes as sincerity and likability. Thus, our theory implies that even when constituencies perceive a lying demagogue as authentic, they recognize his behavior as insincere and per-haps even inconsiderate, thus accepting him as an "authentic jerk." Findings from the

post-election survey reported in the Appendix show just such perceptions of Trump from Trump supporters. If Trump supporters were inclined to see their candidate in a positive light no matter what he did, they would per-ceive him not only as authentic but also as considerate. To see whether there is a similar empirical pattern in our experimental set-tings, we ran the same tests we ran earlier to validate our hypotheses, but instead of evalu-ating authenticity, we evaluated participants' attributions of considerateness (i.e., an aver-age of attributions of "considerateness," "lik-ability," and "warmth" [Hahl and Zuckerman 2014]). For the sake of brevity, we will report only results from Study 1; results from Study 2 are substantively the same.

In most comparisons, when the lying dem-agogue is deemed less authentic than another candidate, he is also deemed less considerate. This is no surprise. The key test would be to compare attributions of considerateness for participants randomly assigned to the (Study 1 conditions) *outsider/representation crisis/ lying demagogue* condition with perceptions from participants randomly assigned to the *outsider/representation crisis/baseline* condi-tion. Recall that the same comparison for authenticity showed higher perceived authen-ticity in the former condition than in the latter (Hypothesis 1). By contrast, participants in the *outsider/representation crisis/lying dema-gogue* condition ($n = 54$; mean = 3.07) saw the S2-type (outsider) candidate as less con-siderate (z-score = 1.98; $p < .05$) than did participants randomly assigned to the *out-sider/representation crisis/baseline* condition ($n = 52$; mean = 3.36).

These results suggest a highly nuanced relationship between political grievance and response to lying demagoguery. In short, aggrieved constituencies are motivated to interpret the lying demagogue as an authentic champion because this is a reasonable inter-pretation of his actions, and not because they attribute positive attributes to him across the board. Indeed, they reasonably tend to see him as less considerate, but they accept this as a worthwhile tradeoff in the context of a

legitimacy crisis. More generally, although authenticity is typically regarded as a positive moral attribute (Carroll and Wheaton 2009; Hahl 2016), and it often goes hand-in-hand with perceptions of considerateness (Hahl and Zuckerman 2014), in the case of the lying demagogue these two moral attributes may be negatively correlated, thus leading to a more ambiguous moral status overall.

DISCUSSION

We now put our theory and results in a broader context by considering (1) the implications for research on attributions of authenticity; (2) general implications for explaining stark partisan differences in the perception of political candidates; and (3) how our analysis relates to the 2016 U.S. presidential election.

Implications for Attributions of Authenticity

Cultural, economic, and organizational sociologists have recently paid considerable attention to how and why authenticity is demanded of various actors, and how that demand is met (Carroll and Wheaton 2009; Grazian 2005; Hahl 2016; Hahl and Zuckerman 2014; Hahl et al. 2017; Lehman, Kovács, and Carroll 2014). We have already noted an important contribution to this literature—the idea that authenticity can be attained even through actions that are perceived as morally problematic (due to a perceived lack of sincerity or prosociality). More generally, this article reinforces two key points regarding the logic underlying perceptions of authenticity: (1) *such perceptions pertain to a particular claim, which may not be the explicit claim that is made;* and (2) *these perceptions are highly audience-specific.* The latter point comes out quite clearly in our analyses: perceptions of authenticity vary substantially based on the social category with which the subject identified. We know of no prior result in the literature that demonstrates differences across audiences in their attributions of authenticity to the very same performance.

The second point has even more far-reaching implications. Considerable prior research suggests that an actor will appear less authentic when she seems driven by extrinsic rather than intrinsic motives (Hahl 2016; Hahl and Zuckerman 2014; Hahl et al. 2017; Sagiv 2014). But as we noted in the introduction, it is hard to understand how *any politician*—let alone a lying demagogue—could ever seem authentic if that were true. How can a politician shed the suspicion she is pursuing elective office to gain status, power, and perhaps riches as well? Indeed, politicians are not alone in this quandary: some capitalists (e.g., purveyors of get-rich-quick-schemes) are regarded as authentic by their audience even though they are quite open about their pursuit of extrinsic rewards. Our theory helps resolve such puzzles. The key is that authenticity—an assessment of whether someone is indeed what she claims to be—is evaluated with respect to a particular claim. Politicians seem less authentic to the extent that they claim not to be extrinsically motivated, yet they appear to enjoy greater power, status, or wealth as a result of their political career. By contrast, a politician who makes no such claim does not risk his authenticity. Similarly, the insecurity that many professionals and managers feel in today's culture derives from the fact that they implicitly claim to work for intrinsic and prosocial motives rather than extrinsic rewards (see Hahl et al. 2017). It is only with this general insight that we can understand how someone can be regarded as insincere yet authentic. As we discussed, this makes sense only if the audience perceives the speaker to be using a false statement to make a larger implicit claim—in this case, about how publicly-endorsed norms (the most general of which is truth-telling) are imposed on the aggrieved audience that is the target for the claim.

Partisan Differences in Perception: Which Mechanisms Are Sufficient and Which Are Necessary?

Let us now turn to the specific question we address in this article—how and why

a constituency of voters can view a lying demagogue as authentic. Little research has been conducted specifically on this question. Nevertheless, the topic is clearly related to the larger question of what might account for the stark differences in how supporters of different political candidates/parties interpret candidates' statements and actions. Our article has two sets of implications for such research—it illuminates both what is *sufficient* for explaining such differences and what is *necessary*.

First, whereas past research suggests that differences in partisan identification can lead voters to interpret problematic actions and false statements by their preferred candidates in ways favorable to that candidate (Berinsky 2017; Nyhan and Reifler 2010, 2017; Swire et al. 2017; Westen et al. 2006), and it can cause people to view candidates' bad behavior in a favorable light (Valdesolo and DeSteno 2007), we have shown that such partisan identification is insufficient to explain the authentic appeal of the lying demagogue (for recent research that shows limits to the extent to which partisanship shapes one's views, see Nyhan et al. 2017; Wood and Porter 2016). On the one hand, our studies support such research: study participants who were not from the social category of the lying demagogue *never* perceived him as authentic. But we also show that unless there is a crisis of legitimacy, members of the lying demagogue's category do not perceive him as authentic. Moreover, even when there is a legitimacy crisis, constituents of the lying demagogue do not perceive him to be considerate. Thus, the partisan lens by which the same political facts acquire starkly different political interpretations is a highly specific form of motivated reasoning, one that is constrained to be a reasonable interpretation of available information. More specifically, strong partisanship may often be insufficient to generate such differences; a legitimacy crisis may also be necessary. A legitimacy crisis may encourage partisans to see the lying demagogue as proclaiming a suppressed truth, but it does not blind them to the fact that he is acting like a "jerk" or that he may not be competent.

Second, our analysis suggests that many purportedly important factors in explaining partisan differences can be ruled out as necessary for explaining such differences. In reference to the 2016 U.S. presidential election, observers and scholars have cited (1) cultural differences, (2) differences in information access, and (3) candidates' gender.[19] Each factor is plausibly important for explaining partisan differences in the case of the 2016 election and more generally. For instance, Vance (2016) and Williams (2017) point to stark cultural divides between the Trump and Clinton constituencies, which reflect long-standing sociological research on cultural differences between (white) working-class and upper-middle-class Americans (especially Lamont and Molnár 2002; Lareau 2003). In particular, Trump's attacks on the snobbery of the upper-middle-class cultural elite (a theme of Republican attacks at least since Nixon) seem specifically designed with such cultural divides in mind. In addition, it has become common wisdom (backed by some research [Benkler et al. 2017; but see Allcott and Gentzkow 2017]) that Americans now receive their political news from highly polarized sources; to the extent this is true, it surely increases the tendency for partisan differences in responses to political candidates. Finally, insofar as one might wish to understand why Trump was seen as authentic and Clinton as inauthentic, it seems plausible that this is related to the tendency (by Americans at least) to see competent women as cold and inauthentic (Ridgeway 2011; cf. Hahl and Zuckerman 2014). But our analyses show that *none of these factors are necessary to produce sharp partisan differences in interpreting the same political facts, and in particular to produce differences in responses to a lying demagogue.*

To be sure, this does not mean that culture, information access, or a candidate's gender are unimportant. Quite possibly, each of these factors might reinforce the factor we establish here as sufficient—belonging to an aggrieved social category in a crisis of legitimacy. Differences in culture, the use of different information sources, and perhaps the use of gender

stereotypes might be shaped by whether one is experiencing a legitimacy crisis. In particular, values such as warmth and loyalty might have particular appeal when one sees the elite as serving itself at the expense of the populace (cf. Haidt 2012; Lamont and Molnár 2002). It seems natural to gravitate toward media sources that describe the world in terms of the legitimacy crisis that one perceives. Thus, although we have established that such factors as culture, information access, and candidate gender are unnecessary for explaining sharp partisan differences in responding to the same political facts, future research is necessary to tease out how these important factors relate to the one we have validated here—membership in an aggrieved social category in a legitimacy crisis.

Relationship to the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election

This article was animated by a puzzle that emerged from the 2016 presidential election: How could a candidate who repeatedly told lies and flagrantly broke norms be viewed as authentic by his supporters? One possibility is that his supporters thought his false statements were true. Accordingly, Swire and colleagues (2017) demonstrate that Trump's supporters were more likely to believe false statements by Trump, and to be resistant to correction by neutral sources. But although our post-election survey (see Appendix) provides additional support for this effect, it also demonstrates that most Trump supporters recognized one of his most notorious lies as false, and that the key difference between Trump voters' and Clinton voters' perceptions of this lie was that the former viewed it as a form of symbolic protest. Moreover, Trump voters' tendency to perceive this symbolic protest was significantly correlated with their tendency to see him as authentic and to be enthusiastic in their support for him.

The idea that Trump's lies were a form of symbolic protest achieved significant currency in the media by October 2016 due to an article by Salena Zito of *The Atlantic*. She summarized the idea as follows: "The press

takes [Trump] literally, but not seriously; his supporters take him seriously, but not literally." In addition to providing supporting evidence for this insight, our article contributes to public debates by sharpening the logic that underlies Zito's observation and by taking it out of the charged atmosphere of the election to an experimental setting where we demonstrate the mechanisms that turn on and off the tendency to perceive lying demagoguery as symbolic protest. Put differently, to recognize that Trump supporters viewed his lying demagoguery as symbolic protest is not to explain why they did so. Moreover, one might think this perception was due to partisans' basic tendency to view their candidate's blemishes as beautiful; or it might be due to any of the factors just discussed—culture, information access, or gender stereotyping. Our theory and evidence show that mere partisanship is insufficient to produce this effect and such factors are unnecessary for explaining it. What is sufficient is that one be a member of an aggrieved social category in a legitimacy crisis.

Moreover, our theory fits key facts of the 2016 U.S. presidential election. In particular, much recent scholarship suggests that the U.S. political system was suffering from a legitimacy crisis with regard to certain constituencies, and perhaps most notably the white working class (see Morgan and Lee 2017; cf. Skocpol and Williamson [2013] on the Tea Party movement). Arguably, this legitimacy crisis had aspects of both a representation crisis and a power-devaluation crisis. The latter theme appeared in the Trump campaign's slogan to "Make America Great Again," in Trump's attacks against immigrants, in the campaign's resonance with white working-class voters who saw the Federal government as biased in favor of people of color (Hochschild and Hout 2017), and in the argument that norms of "political correctness" that favor new social categories had been foisted upon the country (Hochschild 2016; McElwee and McDaniel 2017; Williams 2017; cf. Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016; Willer, Feinberg, and Wetts 2016). The themes of a representation crisis were also

quite strong, as reflected in the Trump campaign's call to "drain the swamp," and the attacks on Hillary Clinton for being corrupt and careless with U.S. interests and for being distant from "real Americans."

We should note why Donald Trump seems to have been particularly well-suited to play the part of authentic champion via lying demagoguery. As Bonikowski and Gidron (2016a) show, populism is the style of the political outsider. We argued that a key reason why it seems plausible that the lying demagogue is bravely speaking truth about power is that his flagrant norm violation makes him *persona non grata* among the establishment. In Trump's case, he had already been an outcast for many years among the cultural elite (see Kruse 2017). Indeed, an off-cited motivation for his presidential campaign was to counter his humiliation at the hands of Barack Obama at the 2011 White House Correspondents' Dinner,[20] which made it abundantly clear how detested he was in the elite establishment. But insofar as Trump had no chance of being acceptable in elite eyes, this made him even more credible as an authentic champion of his supporters—mainly Americans who also felt disrespected by cultural elites. And it likely made his lying demagoguery even more credible. If the key to the authentic appeal of the lying demagogue is that he is signaling a willingness to be regarded as a pariah by the establishment, Trump was certainly a credible pariah. In this sense, his statements reminded his voters that he is a pariah just like them.[21]

Finally, while our theory and results provide a sufficient explanation for the authentic appeal of the lying demagogue, we do not exclude the possibility of other advantages that lying demagoguery may have for a politician. In particular, a political leader may tell obvious lies to test his followers and thereby escalate their commitment to him. This is the logic that Orwell (1949) made famous in his analysis of totalitarianism, and it has been documented in modern authoritarian regimes (e.g., Wedeen 1999). Post-election, this logic may be salient for Trump as well (Yglesias 2017). Indeed, Trump supporters may have found his lying demagoguery as a candidate to

be authentically appealing, and they may continue to support him once in office as a means of demonstrating loyalty to one another.

Conclusion

Our experimental analyses provide clear support for our proposed resolution of the puzzle of how a lying demagogue may be viewed as more authentic than a candidate who neither lies nor flagrantly violates publicly-endorsed norms. In short, our theory revolves around two ideas: (1) a political candidate can achieve a perception of authenticity in two ways—via sincerity and via authentic championhood; and (2) members of aggrieved social categories in a crisis of legitimacy will be motivated to see the lying demagogue as an authentic champion. Our results provide strong support for these ideas. Indeed, it is worth highlighting that the subtle experimental manipulations we introduced were sufficient to turn on and off these mechanisms. Finally, the fact that we were able to reproduce largely the same pattern of results in two different types of legitimacy crises adds further credence to our results.

APPENDIX: POST-ELECTION SURVEY ON PERCEPTION OF TRUMP'S FALSE STATEMENTS

Study design. The post-election survey was conducted on November 16th, 2017, eight days after the U.S. presidential election, on Amazon Mechanical Turk. Participants, who were restricted to U.S. IP addresses, were told that the purpose of the survey was "to assess what kinds of impressions voters form about presidential candidates." In reality, the study was designed to assess whether (1) it is possible for voters to view a candidate—Donald Trump, in particular—as authentic despite recognizing that he deliberately told a demagogic lie; and (2) whether his supporters justified this behavior as a form of symbolic protest. Alternatively, Trump's supporters might view him as authentic because they do not see his demagogic lies as such. To rule in

the mechanism we propose through this survey, we would need to show that (1) Trump supporters accept that his statements are demagogic falsehoods, (2) they are more likely than Clinton supporters to view this as symbolic protest, and (3) people who view the demagogic falsehood as symbolic protest are also more likely (than those who do not) to see Trump as authentic.

Recruitment. We recruited 402 U.S.-based study participants through Amazon's Mechanical Turk tool. We used a quota process to recruit similar numbers of Clinton and Trump supporters and ended up with 186 participants who reported that they voted for Trump, 177 who voted for Clinton, and 39 who voted for other candidates. We had 192 male participants and 205 female participants (five did not report gender). This survey is based on an unrepresentative sample of the U.S. population and of Trump voters in particular. Nonetheless, it affords a view into the inner logic of some voters' thinking, which is sufficient to rule in the possibility of our proposed mechanism as a reason for Trump supporters to see him as authentic.

Survey procedure. After explaining the purported goal of the survey and collecting political and demographic information, participants were shown the following statement, which Trump posted on his Twitter account on November 6th, 2012, and which was mentioned multiple times by the media during his presidential campaign: "The concept of global warming was created by and for the Chinese in order to make U.S. manufacturing noncompetitive." We chose this statement because it is demagogic in that it violates the publicly-endorsed norm of not making unsubstantiated accusations against another country while appealing to xenophobic beliefs about China that many Americans may harbor. Furthermore, it was publicized as untrue by the media. We presented the statement as a falsehood to participants, who were told that "[t]his statement has definitively been demonstrated to be factually untrue." Then, after an attention-check, participants were asked three

questions on seven-point Likert scales. All participants were asked two questions: (1) their level of belief that Trump's statement was factually true or false; and (2) their level of agreement that Trump meant the statement literally. The sample was randomly split in half for the third question, which pertained to Trump's motive for making the statement. Half the sample was asked to rate their level of agreement that "this was his way of sending a message that he is opposed to the elite establishment"; the other half of the sample was asked to rate their level of agreement that "this was his way of achieving popularity or power." Participants were then asked a series of questions about the two candidates' characteristics (e.g., authenticity, competence, likability). Participants were also asked how enthusiastic they were about each candidate before the election.

Main results. Three main results from the survey inform our understanding of the underlying logic of Trump voters' thinking. First, the Trump voters among the survey participants viewed Trump as highly authentic, a perception that was significantly correlated with their enthusiasm for him. In particular, among Trump voters, 61.8 percent rated Trump as highly authentic, and only 5.9 percent saw Trump as highly inauthentic; the level of enthusiasm for Trump was significantly higher for the former (mean for Trump voters who saw Trump as highly authentic = 3.51 versus mean for Trump voters who saw Trump as highly inauthentic = 4.91; $t = 2.26$; $p < .05$; DF = 122).[22] Moreover, not only did Trump voters perceive Trump to be more authentic than Clinton (M for Trump = 2.48 versus M for Clinton = 5.15; $t = 15.74$; $p < .001$; DF = 370), but Trump voters' perception of Trump's authenticity was higher than Clinton voters' perception of *Clinton's authenticity* (M for Trump voters on Trump = 2.48 versus M for Clinton voters on Clinton = 3.68; $t = 7.02$; $p < .001$; DF = 361).[23] We find no simple relationship between perceptions of a candidate's authenticity and support for that candidate. At least among these survey respondents, Trump voters' high rating of his authenticity is distinctive.

The second main result is that the principal way these Trump voters reconciled Trump's lying demagoguery with his perceived authenticity was by recognizing the demagogic lie as a lie but justifying it as symbolic protest. To be sure, Trump voters were significantly more likely than Clinton voters to rate the false demagogic statement as true: 68.8 percent of these Trump voters saw the statement as highly false, compared to 95.5 percent of Clinton voters (M for Trump voters = 5.90 versus M for Clinton voters = 6.80; *t* = 6.80; *p* < .001; DF = 361). But 68.8 percent of survey participants who supported Trump rated the statement as highly false, and *only 5.34 percent of Trump voters saw the statement as highly true.*[24]

By contrast, Trump supporters were significantly more likely to justify the lie as a form of symbolic protest. In particular, a significantly higher fraction of Trump voters agreed that Trump did *not* literally mean the Chinese created the concept of global warming than rated the statement as true (M = 3.91 versus M = 5.90; *t* = 11.63; *p* < .001; DF = 370).[25] Trump voters were also much more likely to think the statement "was his way of challenging the elite establishment" than to see the statement as true (M = 3.67 versus M = 5.90; *t* = 10.35; *p* < .001; DF = 370).[26] Finally, Trump voters were more likely to see Trump as authentic the less they took the statement literally (corr. = .22; *t* = 3.02; *p* < .01; DF = 184). Trump voters were also more likely to see Trump as authentic the more they saw the statement as a challenge to elites (corr. = .36; *t* = 3.61; *p* < .001; DF = 89).[27]

The final main result dovetails with key experimental results from the article: whereas in past research, perceptions of authenticity are accompanied by perceptions of sincerity and warmth (Hahl and Zuckerman 2014; Hahl et al. 2017), this was not the case here. In particular, among Trump voters, Trump's perceived authenticity was significantly higher than his perceived sincerity (M for authenticity = 2.48 versus M for sincerity = 2.87; *t* = 2.52; *p* = .01; DF = 370), a result consistent with the interpretation that Trump supporters recognized that he was lying but viewed him as authentic nonetheless. In addition, Trump's perceived authenticity was also significantly higher than his perceived warmth among Trump voters (M for authenticity = 2.48 versus M for warmth = 3.41; *t* = 5.98; *p* < .001; DF = 370). This reflects the observation that Trump's supporters appreciated him as an "authentic jerk" (Zogby 2016). This is in line with how study participants who were in the same social category as the lying demagogue perceived the lying demagogue when there was a legitimacy crisis.

Finally, and again in line with the experimental results, we did not find evidence that perceptions of Trump's authenticity vary by gender. Women saw him as less authentic (M = 4.00) than did men (M = 4.28), although not significantly so (*t* = 1.27; *p* = .21; DF = 395). Nor were women different from men in perceptions of Trump's competence (M for women = 4.11 versus M for men = 4.11; *t* = .18; *p* = .86; DF = 395). Note, however, that there were gender differences in perceptions of Clinton. Men saw Clinton as marginally less authentic (M for women = 4.68 versus M for men = 4.32; *t* = 1.93; *p* < .06; DF = 395), an effect driven by Clinton voters (M for women = 3.95 versus M for men = 3.43; *t* = 2.02; *p* < .05; DF = 395). Men also saw Clinton as less competent than did women (M for women = 3.67 versus M for men = 3.08; *t* = 2.83; *p* < .01; DF = 395).

Discussion. The post-election survey results provide useful external validity for key experimental results presented in the article. In short, we see that support for a lying demagogue is not simply a desire to ascribe positive characteristics to a preferred candidate. These Trump voters could have viewed him as warm and sincere, but they did not. They also could have chosen to justify his lie by insisting that it was true. Instead, they justified it as a form of symbolic protest, viewing him as increasingly authentic the more they did so. Finally, Trump supporters in our sample were more enthusiastic in their support of him to the extent that they used this justification. Were we to only have these results, however, we would be left with the puzzle of what prompted Trump voters to use such motivated reasoning. Our theory suggests that they believed the political

system was treating their social category unfairly, either because the establishment was self-serving (representation crisis) or because the establishment was illegitimately favoring upstart social categories (power-devaluation crisis). Our experimental results validate the conjecture that the authentic appeal of a lying demagogue is indeed enabled by such conditions.

Acknowledgments

Notes

1. The post-election survey described in the Appendix provides some support for the widespread observation (e.g., Nyhan 2015) that Clinton had an authenticity problem.

2. Perhaps the most notorious falsehood in Clinton's career was her 2008 statement that, in 1996 in her capacity as First Lady of the United States, she landed in Bosnia "under sniper fire" (see Kessler 2016).

3. Trump himself admitted that in the past he had been "greedy . . . I've grabbed all the money I could get. But now I want to be greedy for the United States" (Golshan 2016). Beyond appearing to care about his personal fortune, he was widely seen as extraordinarily sensitive to criticism, engaging in public feuds with various critics, such as the reporter Megyn Kelly.

4. As of February 19, 2017, including Trump's time as candidate and his first month as president, Politifact rated 33 percent of his statements as "half true" or "mostly false" and 50 percent as "false" or "pants on fire."

5. Trump's norm violations were so numerous they are hard to catalogue. Some, such as name calling (e.g., "Lying Ted" [for his primary opponent Senator Ted Cruz] and "Little Marco" [for his primary opponent Senator Marco Rubio]), were so routine that the deviance became normalized (cf. Vaughan 1996). Moreover, while Clinton labored to signal her commitment to the norms she violated (by apologizing for past failures or suggesting the violations were unintended), Trump often defended his norm violations as justified. For example, it is a basic norm of any nation-state that prisoners of war are to be treated with reverence, but Trump accused former

POW (and current U.S. Senator) John McCain of having been a poor airman. Trump also publicly impugned the impartiality of a Federal judge due to his Mexican heritage, violating the norm that all U.S. citizens—and certainly judges—are presumed equally committed to upholding the law regardless of their racial, ethnic, or religious origins. Finally, Trump began his political career by assuming leadership of the "birther" movement, which alleged against all evidence that President Obama was not born in the United States—an allegation Trump eventually dropped without explanation while suggesting falsely that Clinton's 2008 campaign had originated the allegation.

6. Hong's norm violations were also countless. For instance, he proudly stated in his autobiography that he conspired to rape his female college classmate, and he stood by the statement during the campaign, which was largely treated with dismay even by his conservative base (Choe and Goldman 2017).

7. Following Hahl and colleagues (2017), we maintain that this definition underlies lay uses of the term "authenticity" by Americans (we also believe it unifies various treatments by scholars). This assumption is indirectly tested in our studies via predictive validity. Insofar as our experimental studies successfully manipulate perceptions of authenticity in line with our theory, this implies that respondents overlap in how they use the term. We appreciate the help of Omar Lizardo in helping to clarify the conceptual issues here.

8. Arguably, this is not a lie because he did not intend to raise taxes at the time he made the pledge (the 1988 presidential campaign). We would contend, however, that the premise of a blanket pledge like this is that *one knows oneself so well that one can commit to not violating the pledge under any circumstances*.

9. Carroll and Wheaton (2009) call this "moral" authenticity (see also Hahl 2016). Of course, the lying demagogue is not moral, as defined by establishment norms, but the very "immoral" actions that make him a lying demagogue can (under certain circumstances) fit the moral authenticity definition—and thus help establish his standing as a true representative of the suppressed people he claims to serve. In our analyses, we show how even members of his own party see the lying demagogue as an "authentic jerk."

10. See Donald J. Trump's "I am your voice!" appeal to voters, issued at the 2016 Republican National Convention (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BEuboZ98TxE).

11. This is in fact a quite common debate on college campuses in recent years (Duncan 2015), and our design is reflective of real-world examples where there are often coherent principles for both sides. Otherwise (i.e., if there is only one reasonable side of argument), subjects may think that the candidate

12. We lay out the exact wording used in each manipulation in an online supplement.

13. To test whether we generated a representation crisis as planned, we ran a series of Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney signed-rank tests comparing the authenticity ratings of the Q2-type incumbent candidate in the *representation crisis* conditions with the ratings of the Q2-type candidate in the *no representation crisis* conditions, all else being equal. Insofar as a representation crisis elicits a sense that members of the S2-type (outsider) category are not fairly represented, the Q2-type (incumbent) candidate should consistently appear less authentic in the *representation crisis* conditions than in the *no representation crisis* conditions. Results confirm that the manipulation worked as intended (mean authenticity of Q2-type [incumbent] candidate in the *representation crisis* conditions = 3.59 versus mean authenticity of Q2-type [incumbent] candidate in the *no crisis* conditions = 5.41; W = 8651.5; *z*-score = 11.54; *p* < .001). Results are substantively the same even if we restrict analyses to participants who were randomly assigned to the Q2-type (thus creating identification with the incumbent candidate). This is additional evidence that identification with the candidate alone does not necessarily lead voters to view all of a candidate's blemishes as beautiful.

14. The authors regret having to repeat such a misogynistic statement, and certainly do not endorse it.

15. In Study 1, we also assigned subjects to "intermediate" conditions in which the candidate either only lied or only used the demagogic or inflammatory statement. We only present results from the full lying demagogue (both lying and demagogic) and baseline (neither lying nor demagogic) conditions. Results from the intermediate conditions show that either lying or making demagogic statements elicit increased perceptions of authenticity in the representation crisis as predicted by the Hypotheses. Note, though, that this effect is weaker in these intermediate conditions than if the candidate used *both* lying *and* demagogic statements in his speech. Because of this, for Study 2 we excluded the intermediate conditions.

16. Because *t*-test assumes equal variance between two populations of comparisons, which we cannot necessarily assume in our samples, we use the Mann-Whitney test that does not necessitate that assumption (Fay and Proschan 2000; Wilcoxon 1945).

17. Figure 8 reports results from Study 1 only. Results from Study 2 are substantively similar.

18. Note that, as reported in the Appendix, we also found no evidence in the post-election survey for a gender difference in perceptions of Donald Trump's authenticity. Yet, men did see Clinton as less authentic (significant among Clinton voters) and less competent (among both Clinton and Trump voters) than did women.

19. Another possibility is that each candidate's constituencies had different personalities, with some evidence suggesting that Trump supporters scored high on measures of authoritarianism (e.g., Pettigrew 2017). Our results cast serious doubt on the causal direction of such results, suggesting they are the result of location in socio-political space rather than the cause.

20. See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k8TwRmX6zs4.

21. Another enabling factor may be Trump's paradoxical tendency to tell the truth when most politicians would tell a "prosocial lie" (Levine and Schweitzer 2015; cf. Mearsheimer 2010). In particular, since his inauguration, on several occasions Trump has revealed information that was presumably either injurious to the public welfare (e.g., revealing classified information to the Russian foreign minister [Rosenberg and Schmitt 2017]) or to himself (e.g., by informing an interviewer that he had fired Attorney General James Comey because of "this Russia thing" [Baker and Shear 2017]). Ironically, telling the truth under such circumstances may make Trump seem more authentic when he is telling common-knowledge lies. This tendency was also in evidence when Trump was a candidate, such as when Trump admitted to holding grudges—something that most people deny (see Jacobs and Hahn 2015).

22. We define "highly authentic" as when participants gave a 1 or a 2 on a seven-point scale (e.g., 1 = very authentic to 7 = very inauthentic). Conversely, by "highly inauthentic," we mean participants gave a 6 or 7 on the same scale. We use the same definition for the term "highly" for all other items.

23. Among Clinton voters, 29.94 percent saw Clinton as highly authentic, and 17.51 percent saw her as highly inauthentic.

24. Among Clinton voters, .56 percent saw the statement as highly true.

25. Unsurprisingly, Trump voters (M = 3.91) were much more likely than Clinton voters (M = 5.88) to agree that "he did not *literally* mean" the statement (*t* = 11.67; *p* < .001; DF = 361).

26. Trump voters (M = 3.67) were also more likely than Clinton voters (M = 5.37) to agree that "[the statement] was his way of sending a message that he is opposed to the 'elite' establishment" (*t* = 6.30; *p* < .001; DF = 179).

27. There was no statistically significant tendency for Trump voters to see Trump as more authentic the less they saw his statement as motivated by "power and popularity" (corr. = –.10; *t* = .99; *p* = .32; DF = 93). This reflects the fact that they saw no necessary contradiction between his pursuit of power and popularity and his pursuit of their interests.

ORCID iD

Oliver Hahl https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2726-321X

References

Abrams, Dominic, Georgina Randsley de Moura, José M. Marques, and Paul Hutchison. 2008. "Innovation Credit: When Can Leaders Oppose Their Group's Norms?" *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 95(3):662–78.

Adut, Ari. 2008. *On Scandal: Moral Disturbances in Society, Politics, and Art*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Allcott, Hunt, and Matthew Gentzkow. 2017. "Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election." Working Paper 23089. National Bureau of Economic Research (http://www.nber.org/papers/w23089).

Baker, Peter, and Michael D. Shear. 2017. "Trump Shifts Rationale for Firing Comey, Calling Him a 'Showboat.'" *The New York Times,* May 11, sec. Politics (https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/11/us/politics/trump-comey-showboat-fbi.html).

Bartneck, Christoph, Andreas Duenser, Elena Moltchanova, and Karolina Zawieska. 2015. "Comparing the Similarity of Responses Received from Studies in Amazon's Mechanical Turk to Studies Conducted Online and with Direct Recruitment." PloS One 10(4):e0121595 (https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0121595).

Benkler, Yochai, Robert Faris, Hal Roberts, and Ethan Zuckerman. 2017. "Study: Breitbart-Led Right-Wing Media Ecosystem Altered Broader Media Agenda." March 3, *Columbia Journalism Review*. Retrieved July 11 (https://www.cjr.org/analysis/breitbart-media-trump-harvard-study.php).

Berinsky, Adam J. 2017. "Rumors and Health Care Reform: Experiments in Political Misinformation." *British Journal of Political Science* 47(2):241–62.

Berinsky, Adam J., Gregory A. Huber, and Gabriel S. Lenz. 2012. "Evaluating Online Labor Markets for Experimental Research: Amazon.com's Mechanical Turk." *Political Analysis* 20(3):351–68.

Bonikowski, Bart, and Paul DiMaggio. 2016. "Varieties of American Popular Nationalism." *American Sociological Review* 81(5):949–80.

Bonikowski, Bart, and Noam Gidron. 2016a. "The Populist Style in American Politics: Presidential Campaign Discourse, 1952–1996." *Social Forces* 94(4):1593–1621.

Bonikowski, Bart, and Noam Gidron. 2016b. "Multiple Traditions in Populism Research: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis." *Comparative Politics Newsletter* 26(2):7–15.

Buhrmester, Michael, Tracy Kwang, and Samuel D. Gosling. 2011. "Amazon's Mechanical Turk: A New Source of Inexpensive, Yet High-Quality, Data?" *Perspectives on Psychological Science* 6(1):3–5.

Carroll, Glenn R., and Dennis Ray Wheaton. 2009. "The Organizational Construction of Authenticity: An Examination of Contemporary Food and Dining in the U.S." *Research in Organizational Behavior* 29(January):255–82.

Centola, Damon, Robb Willer, and Michael Macy. 2005. "The Emperor's Dilemma: A Computational Model of Self-Enforcing Norms." *American Journal of Sociology* 110(4):1009–40.

Chang, Jin Wook, Nazlı Turan, and Rosalind M. Chow. 2015. "A Desire for Deviance: The Influence of Leader Normativeness and Inter-Group Competition on Group Member Support." *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 56(January):36–49.

Choe, Sang-Hun, and Russell Goldman. 2017. "South Korea's Next President: A Look at the Leading Candidates." *The New York Times,* May 3, sec. Asia Pacific (https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/03/world/asia/south-korea-election-moon-jae-in-ahn-cheol-soo-hong-joon-pyo-trump.html).

Cramer, Katherine J. 2016. *The Politics of Resentment: Rural Consciousness in Wisconsin and the Rise of Scott Walker*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Davis, Michael L., and Michael Ferrantino. 1996. "Towards a Positive Theory of Political Rhetoric: Why Do Politicians Lie?" *Public Choice* 88(1–2):1–13.

Duncan, Jericka. 2015. "Will Dartmouth's Hard Alcohol Ban Make Students Safer?" *CBS News*. Retrieved July 10, 2017 (http://www.cbsnews.com/news/will-dartmouths-hard-alcohol-ban-make-students-safer/).

Fay, Michael P., and Michael A. Proschan. 2000. "Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney or T-Test? On Assumptions for Hypothesis Tests and Multiple Interpretations of Decision Rules." *Statistics Surveys* 4:1–39.

Frankfurt, Harry G. 2005. *On Bullshit*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Gest, Justin. 2016. *The New Minority: White Working Class Politics in an Age of Immigration and Inequality*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Goffman, Erving. 1956. *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*. New York: Random House.

Golshan, Tara. 2016. "You Have to See Donald Trump's Counter-Debate to Believe What Happened There." *Vox*. January 28 (https://www.vox.com/2016/1/28/10866252/trump-counter-debate-so-much-america).

Grazian, David. 2005. *Blue Chicago: The Search for Authenticity in Urban Blues Clubs*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Gusfield, Joseph R. 1986. *Symbolic Crusade: Status Politics and the American Temperance Movement*. Champaign: University of Illinois Press.

Gustainis, J. Justin. 1990. "Demagoguery and Political Rhetoric: A Review of the Literature." *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 20(2):155–61.

Hahl, Oliver. 2016. "Turning Back the Clock in Baseball: The Increased Prominence of Extrinsic Rewards and Demand for Authenticity." *Organization Science* 27(4):929–53.

Hahl, Oliver, and Ezra W. Zuckerman. 2014. "The Denigration of Heroes? How the Status Attainment

Process Shapes Attributions of Considerateness and Authenticity." *American Journal of Sociology* 120(2):504–554.

Hahl, Oliver, Ezra W. Zuckerman, and Minjae Kim. 2017. "Why Elites Love Authentic Lowbrow Culture: Overcoming High-Status Denigration with Outsider Art." *American Sociological Review* 82(4):828–56.

Haidt, Jonathan. 2012. *The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion,* reprint ed. New York: Vintage.

Hochschild, Arlie Russell. 2016. *Strangers in Their Own Land: Anger and Mourning on the American Right*. New York: The New Press.

Hochschild, Arlie, and Michael Hout. 2017. "Was Trump a Meteor or a Volcano? Racial Resentment, Immigration, and the Environment Built Up as Strong Predictors of Whites' Votes Before the 2016 Election." Working paper, New York University Population Center.

Hofstadter, Richard. 1955. *The Age of Reform*. New York: Vintage.

Jacobs, Jennifer, and Henry Hahn. 2015. "In Iowa, Star of 'Summer of Trump' Makes Grand Promises." *Des Moines Register*. Retrieved August 21 (http://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/elections/presidential/caucus/2015/08/25/-iowa-trump-says-he-holds-grudges/32362509/).

Jones, Ben. 2016. "Authenticity in Political Discourse." *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 19(2):489–504.

Judis, John B. 2016. *The Populist Explosion: How the Great Recession Transformed American and European Politics*. New York: Columbia Global Reports.

Kessler, Glenn. 2016. "Recalling Hillary Clinton's Claim of 'Landing under Sniper Fire' in Bosnia." *Washington Post,* May 23, sec. Fact Checker (https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2016/05/23/recalling-hillary-clintons-claim-of-landing-under-sniper-fire-in-bosnia/).

Kim, Minjae. 2017. "A Man Is Known by His Cup: Signaling Commitment via Costly Conformity." Working paper, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Kim, Minjae, and Ezra W. Zuckerman Sivan. 2017. "Faking It Is Hard to Do: Entrepreneurial Norm Enforcement and Suspicions of Deviance." *Sociological Science* 4(October):580–610.

Kruse, Michael. 2017. "How Gotham Gave Us Trump: Ever Wonder How a Lifelong Urbanite Can Resent Cities as Much as Donald Trump Does? First You Have to Understand '70s and '80s New York." *Politico* July/August (http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/06/30/donald-trump-new-york-city-crime-1970s-1980s-215316).

Kunda, Ziva. 1990. "The Case for Motivated Reasoning." *Psychological Bulletin* 108(3):480–98.

Kuran, Timur. 1995. *Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification,* reprint ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Lamont, Michèle, and Virág Molnár. 2002. "The Study of Boundaries in the Social Sciences." *Annual Review of Sociology* 28(1):167–95.

Lareau, Annette. 2003. *Unequal Childhoods: Class, Race, and Family Life, 2nd Edition with an Update a Decade Later*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Lehman, David W., Balázs Kovács, and Glenn R. Carroll. 2014. "Conflicting Social Codes and Organizations: Hygiene and Authenticity in Consumer Evaluations of Restaurants." *Management Science* 60(10):2602–17.

Levine, Emma E., and Maurice E. Schweitzer. 2015. "Prosocial Lies: When Deception Breeds Trust." *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes* 126(January):88–106.

Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1959. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy." *American Political Science Review* 53(1):69–105.

Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1960. *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics,* expanded ed. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Mason, Winter, and Siddharth Suri. 2012. "Conducting Behavioral Research on Amazon's Mechanical Turk." *Behavior Research Methods* 44(1):1–23.

Mast, Jason L. 2017. "Legitimacy Troubles and the Performance of Power in the 2016 US Presidential Election." *American Journal of Cultural Sociology* 5(3):460–80.

McElwee, Sean, and Jason McDaniel. 2017. "Fear of Diversity Made People More Likely to Vote Trump." *The Nation,* March 14 (https://www.thenation.com/article/fear-of-diversity-made-people-more-likely-to-vote-trump/).

McGraw, Kathleen M. 1998. "Manipulating Public Opinion with Moral Justification." *ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 560(1):129–42.

McGraw, Kathleen M., Milton Lodge, and Jeffrey M. Jones. 2002. "The Pandering Politicians of Suspicious Minds." *Journal of Politics* 64(2):362–83.

McVeigh, Rory. 1999. "Structural Incentives for Conservative Mobilization: Power Devaluation and the Rise of the Ku Klux Klan, 1915–1925." *Social Forces* 77:1461–96.

McVeigh, Rory. 2009. *The Rise of the Ku Klux Klan: Right-Wing Movements and National Politics*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Mearsheimer, John J. 2010. *Why Leaders Lie: The Truth About Lying in International Politics*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Mercieca, Jennifer. 2015. "The Rhetorical Brilliance of Trump the Demagogue." *The Conversation,* December 11 (https://theconversation.com/the-rhetorical-brilliance-of-trump-the-demagogue-51984).

Morgan, Stephen L., and Jiwon Lee. 2017. "The White Working Class and Voter Turnout in U.S. Presidential Elections, 2004 to 2016." *Sociological Science* 4(27):656–85.

Morton, Thomas A., Tom Postmes, and Jolanda Jetten. 2007. "Playing the Game: When Group Success Is More Important than Downgrading Deviants." *European Journal of Social Psychology* 37(4):599–616.

Müller, Jan-Werner. 2016. *What Is Populism?* Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Nyhan, Brendan. 2015. "Scandal Potential: How Political Context and News Congestion Affect the President's Vulnerability to Media Scandal." *British Journal of Political Science* 45(2):435–66.

Nyhan, Brendan, Ethan Porter, Jason Reifler, and Thomas Wood. 2017. "Taking Corrections Literally but Not Seriously? The Effects of Information on Factual Beliefs and Candidate Favorability." SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2995128. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network (https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2995128).

Nyhan, Brendan, and Jason Reifler. 2010. "When Corrections Fail: The Persistence of Political Misperceptions." *Political Behavior* 32(2):303–330.

Nyhan, Brendan, and Jason Reifler. 2017. "The Roles of Information Deficits and Identity Threat in the Prevalence of Misperceptions." Working paper, Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire.

Orwell, George. 1949. *1984*. New York: Signet Classic.

Parigi, Paolo, Jessica J. Santana, and Karen S. Cook. 2017. "Online Field Experiments: Studying Social Interactions in Context." *Social Psychology Quarterly* 80(1):1–19.

Pettigrew, Thomas F. 2017. "Social Psychological Perspectives on Trump Supporters." *Journal of Social and Political Psychology* 5(1):107–116.

Phillips, Damon J., Catherine J. Turco, and Ezra W. Zuckerman. 2013. "Betrayal as Market Barrier: Identity-Based Limits to Diversification among High-Status Corporate Law Firms." *American Journal of Sociology* 118(4):1023–54.

Prentice, Deborah A., and Dale T. Miller. 1993. "Pluralistic Ignorance and Alcohol Use on Campus: Some Consequences of Misperceiving the Social Norm." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 64(2):243–56.

Ranulf, Svend. 1964. *Moral Indignation and Middle Class Psychology: A Sociological Study,* 1st Schocken pbk. ed. New York: Schocken Books.

Ridgeway, Cecilia L. 2011. *Framed by Gender: How Gender Inequality Persists in the Modern World*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Ridgeway, Cecilia L., and Shelley J. Correll. 2006. "Consensus and the Creation of Status Beliefs." *Social Forces* 85(1):431–53.

Rosenberg, Matthew, and Eric Schmitt. 2017. "Trump Revealed Highly Classified Intelligence to Russia, in Break with Ally, Officials Say." *The New York Times,* May 15, sec. Politics (https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/15/us/politics/trump-russia-classified-information-isis.html).

Sagiv, Tamar. 2014. "Reinvesting Dance with Meaning: Authenticity and Ingenuity in the Artistic Dance Field." Pp. 155–81 in *Handbook of Organizational and Entrepreneurial Ingenuity,* edited by B. Honig, J. Lampel, and I. Drori. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing.

Skocpol, Theda, and Vanessa Williamson. 2013. *The Tea Party and the Remaking of Republican Conservatism,* reprint ed. New York: Oxford University Press.

Swaim, Barton. 2016. "Donald Trump Tries to Kill Political Correctness — and Ends up Saving It." *Washington Post,* November 1, Online. Retrieved November 29, 2017 (https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/donald-trump-has-made-political-correctness-credible-again/2016/11/01/0f397c0c-9fb1-11e6-a44d-cc2898cfab06_story.html).

Swire, Briony, Adam J. Berinsky, Stephan Lewandowsky, and Ullrich K. H. Ecker. 2017. "Processing Political Misinformation: Comprehending the Trump Phenomenon." *Open Science* 4(3):160802.

Tajfel, Henri, M. G. Billig, R. P. Bundy, and Claude Flament. 1971. "Social Categorization and Intergroup Behaviour." *European Journal of Social Psychology* 1(2):149–78.

Valdesolo, Piercarlo, and David DeSteno. 2007. "Moral Hypocrisy: Social Groups and the Flexibility of Virtue." *Psychological Science* 18(8):689–90.

Vance, J. D. 2016. *Hillbilly Elegy: A Memoir of a Family and Culture in Crisis,* reprint ed. New York: Harper.

Vaughan, Diane. 1996. *The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Wedeen, Lisa. 1999. *Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Westen, Drew, Pavel S. Blagov, Keith Harenski, Clint Kilts, and Stephan Hamann. 2006. "Neural Bases of Motivated Reasoning: An fMRI Study of Emotional Constraints on Partisan Political Judgment in the 2004 U.S. Presidential Election." *Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience* 18(11):1947–58.

Wilcoxon, Frank. 1945. "Individual Comparisons by Ranking Methods." *Biometrics Bulletin* 1(6):80–83.

Willer, Robb, Matthew Feinberg, and Rachel Wetts. 2016. "Threats to Racial Status Promote Tea Party Support among White Americans." SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2770186. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network (https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2770186).

Willer, Robb, Ko Kuwabara, and Michael W. Macy. 2009. "The False Enforcement of Unpopular Norms." *American Journal of Sociology* 115(2):451–90.

Williams, Joan C. 2017. *White Working Class: Overcoming Class Cluelessness in America*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business Review Press.

Wood, Thomas. 2017. "Analysis | Racism Motivated Trump Voters More than Authoritarianism." *Washington Post*, April 17 (https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/04/17/racism-motivated-trump-voters-more-than-authoritarianism-or-income-inequality/).

Wood, Thomas, and Ethan Porter. 2016. "The Elusive Backfire Effect: Mass Attitudes' Steadfast Factual Adherence." SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2819073. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network (https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2819073).

Yamagishi, Toshio, and Toko Kiyonari. 2000. "The Group as the Container of Generalized Reciprocity." *Social Psychology Quarterly* 63(2):116–32.

Yglesias, Matthew. 2017. "The Bullshitter-in-Chief." *Vox*. May 30 (https://www.vox.com/policy-and-polit ics/2017/5/30/15631710/trump-bullshit).

Zito, Salena. 2016. "Taking Trump Seriously, Not Literally." *The Atlantic,* September 23 (https://www .theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/09/trump-makes-his-case-in-pittsburgh/501335/).

Zogby, John. 2016. "Clinton, Trump and the Battle for Authenticity." *Forbes*. Retrieved April 10, 2017 (http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnzogby/2016/09/24/ clinton-trump-and-the-battle-for-authenticity/).

Oliver Hahl is Assistant Professor of Organization Theory and Strategy and Frank A. and Helen E. Frisch Development Professor of Business at Carnegie Mellon University's Tepper School of Business. This article is part of a stream of work related to shifts in demand for authenticity (see 2016 article in *Organization Science* and 2017 article in *American Sociological Review* with Ezra Zuckerman and Minjae Kim) and the relationship between status and authenticity (see 2014 article in *American Journal of Sociology* with Ezra Zuckerman). This is part of a broader research agenda on how audience perceptions of motives influence valuation in markets.

Minjae Kim is a PhD student in the Economic Sociology Program at MIT Sloan School of Management. This article relates to his broader research agenda of (a) how actors signal their identities such as capability, commitment, and authenticity (see his 2017 article in *American Sociological Review* with Oliver Hahl and Ezra Zuckerman); and (b) when and why audience assessment of commitment leads to perpetuation of norms (or a lack thereof; see his 2017 article in *Sociological Science* with Ezra Zuckerman). He also studies when actors are motivated to relay information via their social ties (see his 2017 article in *Social Science Research* with Roberto Fernandez).

Ezra W. Zuckerman Sivan is Deputy Dean and the Alvin J. Siteman (1948) Professor of Strategy and Entrepreneurship at the MIT Sloan School of Management. He is also cofounder of MIT Sloan's PhD Program in Economic Sociology. This article is the latest in a joint stream of work with Oliver Hahl and Minjae Kim (described in their biographical statements). To be clear, however, this research agenda did not include any plans to write an article like the current one until we were shocked into confronting the puzzle of the "authentic appeal of the lying demagogue" on November 8, 2016.